Jan 13, ‘07, The News International

India readying for big moves?

Praful Bidwai

As Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee begins his visit to Pakistan, is there reason for hoping that India is readying for effecting a major change of stance towards its neighbours and that it is getting more serious than ever about achieving a rapprochement with Pakistan? Does Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s remark that he would like to see a day when “one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore and dinner in Kabul” mean something?

The short answer is, yes. Barely a month after President Pervez Musharraf advanced his four-point formula for resolving the Kashmir issue, there is growing realisation in New Delhi that the present moment offers a very special window of opportunity to make big moves towards the entire neighbourhood so as to reorganise India’s relations with it.

This assessment is especially strong in the case of Pakistan—not least because the back-channel discussions between Singh’s special envoy S.K. Lambah and Pakistan’s National Security Adviser Tariq Aziz have made some progress, and because the four-point formula has found resonance across a spectrum of political parties in the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir.

That’s why Singh made bold last fortnight to consult and brief not just the Left parties, which are his ruling coalition’s key allies, but also the Bharatiya Janata Party, which has voiced its apprehensions and suspicions about the recent course of India-Pakistan relations and remains hostile to bilateral reconciliation and peace.

The fact that Lambah was present at the closed-door briefing session with the BJP bears eloquent testimony to the Singh government’s keenness to generate a broad consensus that will help it move forward in reordering relations with neighbours. (It’s not clear, though, that the BJP will come on board in a serious, sincere, and cooperative manner. After the killings of 70 Bhutanese in Assam by “insurgents”, it wanted Mukherjee to cancel his Islamabad visit!).

An important reason for the positive change in New Delhi’s stance and posture is the view that if a breakthrough in relations with Pakistan, or a prelude to one, is to come about, it’s most logical to expect it to happen in 2007, a crucial year for Musharraf’s tenure as president. This is the right time for consolidating and building on the gains of the recent past.

In Islamabad too, Mukherjee’s visit is being seen as part of a larger process of dialogue and conciliation, which could set the framework for the coming fourth round of official-level bilateral talks. Although, Mukherjee’s visit is “SAARC-related”, he will mainly discuss bilateral issues. The bilateral atmospherics have greatly improved.

It’s possible that there will have to be serious progress on visa liberalisation, Sir Creek and Siachen before further fruitful talks can be held on Kashmir. Sir Creek and Siachen demand a reassertion of the government’s political will vis-à-vis a recalcitrant military leadership, or a jaded bureaucracy stuck in a colonial groove of thinking about water boundaries.

A Kashmir solution will demand much more preparation in both countries, as well as purposive consultation with different groups and political currents. But, mercifully, there is reason to believe that this could soon take place. There have been extensive contacts between the Indian government and the moderate faction of the Hurriyat Conference, as well as the National Conference and the People’s Democratic Party, which rule in Jammu and Kashmir.

However, it’s in respect of the smaller neighbours that India is attempting a policy revision that’s even more far-reaching. Such revision is in order as Nepal and Bhutan move towards democratisation—Nepal in a bold, confident manner, and Bhutan in timid, unsure, faltering ways.

New Delhi has offered to revise the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty of 1949 so as to allow that country’s government a more independent foreign policy. The treaty is a colonial inheritance, drawing on a series of unequal agreements imposed by the British. Article 2 of the treaty asks that Bhutan be “guided by the advice of Government of India in regard to its external relations.”

This article was a direct reflection and continuation of Bhutan’s status as a protectorate during the Raj and part of British imperial policy to promote pliable and obedient behaviour on the part of India’s neighbours in the East and the North.

The article cried out for change. Although it’s not clear just how much independence and autonomy Thimpu will have in conducting international affairs under the new “language of friendly cooperation”, the change does mark progress.

Similarly, Article 6 of the treaty will be amended. It allows Bhutan to import “arms, ammunition, machines, warlike material or stores” for its “strength” and “welfare” but with India’s “assistance and approval”. This was used in the past to demand that India must approve every military purchase by Bhutan. This is likely to be relaxed.

No approval will probably be necessary for the purchase of non-lethal military stores and equipment. India’s influence will be directed, according to Foreign Office sources quoted in the Indian media, more through “advice” than “control” in making purchases.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs says these changes “reflect the contemporary nature of our relationship” at the political, strategic and economic level, based on “the firm foundations of historical ties, shared interests and mutually beneficial cooperation.” The amendments aim at strengthening the relationship in a “manner that is responsive to and serves each other’s national interests through close cooperation”. India and Bhutan will intensify cooperation in hydroelectricity, trade and commerce.

India has decided to make these revisions in the context of the King’s abdication and the promised transition to a constitutional democracy. Bhutan is scheduled to hold its first-ever elections next year.

While long overdue and incomplete, the policy change does signify something. Bhutan has been India’s only firm, 100-percent reliable, all-weather ally in international forums. For instance, only India and Bhutan have opposed (sometimes with Mauritius) an annual United Nations resolution calling for discussions to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia. The motion is usually backed by a huge majority of UN member-states, with a handful of countries abstaining.

Bhutan has also recently helped India by cracking down on militants and insurgents from the Indian Northeast who have taken refuge in Bhutan.

India has rewarded Bhutan for this by keeping silent over the expulsion of over 100,000 Bhutanese citizens from the South (or one-seventh of the Kingdom’s population) and by facilitating their entry into Nepal.

India is under pressure to amend the 1950 cooperation and friendship treaty with Nepal too. Nepal’s Maoists want it abrogated altogether. That is unlikely to happen. But some amendments are likely.

In respect of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India faces an altogether different challenge because new crises have broken out there. It is not clear yet how India will respond. But it’s plain that its present policy cannot continue.

The strategic centre-of-gravity of India’s relations with its neighbourhood lies, as always, in its ties with Pakistan. But the new moves are good news indeed even for these relations.—end—